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Statement of the Case. 
This case involves the promise of 50% ownership interest and 50% of the profits in a 
Regulation D Delaware Limited Liability Partnership, in consideration for providing over forty 
years of financial expertise; and specifically for Street Search's track record of raising substantial 
money for investments, and for providing advice and guidance to the fund manager regarding 
high net worth investors. The claim arose when the Appellants discovered the Respondents had 
lied to them about the agreement. However, the Appellants did not discover the Respondents' 
deceit until after the Appellants had fully performed and the fund had achieved astronomical 
growth. 
The Course of the Proceedings Below. 
The Appellants initially contested jurisdiction in Idaho by filing a special appearance and 
objecting to jurisdiction as they are respectively a resident of New Jersey and a New Jersey 
Limited Liability Company. After the Trial Court denied the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for 
lack of Personal Jurisdiction, and after a lengthy and contentious discovery period, the case went 
to trial beginning on Monday, February 6,2012 and concluding on Friday, February 17,2012. 
The Jury entered a verdict finding no contract existed. On Appeal, the Appellants contend they 
did not receive a fair trial as the Trial Court refused to admit relevant evidence; as the Trial 
Court erred in dismissing Appellants' fraud and constructive fraud claims; as the Trial Court 
erred in refusing to allow the Appellants to prove tort damages; and as the Trial Court erred in 
instructing the jury. The Appellants also assert the Trial Court erred when it denied the 
Appellants' Motion for New Trial filed after the Appellants discovered the Respondents had 
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purposefully withheld critical documents and information although the Appellants had requested 
that information through discovery. 
Statement of the Facts. 
Robert Coleman has degrees in finance and accounting and various securities licenses. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 440, L. 21 to p. 442, L. 2l.) He has been a registered investment advisor in Idaho 
since 1992, and does business under the name Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC.! 
In 2000, Coleman created a Regulation D, Hedge Fund, which allowed certain "qualified" 
investors to invest and own precious metals. Coleman claims, " ... there is absolutely no fund in 
the world that is designed like my fund, .... " (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 493, L. 6-7.) While apparently 
unique, after several years, Coleman was marginally successful having only achieved 
approximately $605,000.00 in assets under management during the life of the fund. (T. Vol. 2, p. 
724, L. 8-18.) The Fund was titled "The Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP" and formed under 
the laws of the State of Delaware. 
In May, 2008, Coleman was referred to Jeffrey Podesta by Coleman's accountant in New 
Jersey. Coleman contacted Podesta because Podesta was a "successful individual who raised 
capital." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 499, L. 8-12.) Podesta has extensive experience on Wall Street, and had 
been a stockbroker and a money manager for many years. (T. Vol. 2, p. 372 L. 20 to p. 375, L. 
16.) He also had a successful and longstanding independent contractor relationship with an 
investment firm on Wall Street called Schaefer Cullen. At trial, although Coleman claimed 
Podesta had lied about his ability to raise capital, Podesta testified he earned well over 
I This entity was formed in Delaware, and although Coleman has been operating this company in Idaho since 1992, 
Profits Plus was not lawfully registered in Idaho as a foreign limited liability company until April 15,2010. 
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$120,000.00 per year through his contract with Schaefer Cullen, and that figure resulted from 
compensation based on assets invested with Schafer Cullen. In order to earn $120,000.00, 
Podesta's minimum income, based on the compensation structure, Podesta would have to raise at 
least $60,000,000.00 per year to earn $120,000.00. (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1450, L. 6 to p. 1452, L. 8.) 
The fund allowed investors to deliver their precious metals; gold or silver, to invest into 
the fund or to invest cash and the fund would then purchase precious metals. Coleman touted 
that an investor could benefit regardless of the market fluctuations in precious metal prices as he 
would "hedge" their investments. Coleman charged a "management" fee for the investments, as 
well as an "incentive" fee if the investment appreciated. (Ex. A) 
Since the fund was created, Coleman had stored the invested precious metals in various 
vaults throughout the United States. However, Coleman desired to build his own vault and 
ultimately did so in 2010, after defrauding Street Search, and using Street Search's money for the 
construction. (Ex. G.) 2 
Initially, Podesta was not interested in Coleman's fund; first, because of the minimal 
amounts of assets under management, and because Coleman lacked any history as a successful 
fund manager, but Podesta knew the investment markets and knew that gold in particular was 
increasing in value in 2008. Consequently, Podesta suggested he and Coleman pursue an "open-
ended mutual fund" based loosely on the structure of Coleman's Regulation D, Hedge Fund. 
Unlike the substantial constraints related to a Regulation D investment, any investors could 
invest and would be entitled to own and withdraw actual gold or silver in an open-ended fund. 
2 A copy of Ex. G is attached as Brief Ex. 6. 
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Coleman admitted at trial the deal was, "Jeff and I would be owners in this mutual fund 
company." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 496, L. 5-7.) 
Beginning in February, 2009, Podesta and Coleman pursued the formation of the "open-
ended fund" by contacting potential investors including multinational bank ABNAMRO and a 
large law finn in New York City that specialized in creating mutual funds. Ultimately, Podesta 
and Coleman decided that without significant funding, the open-ended fund was just too 
expensive. Coleman and Podesta then decided not to waste whatever momentum they had and 
gave notice to Ron Spurga with ABNAMRO, "we are building out the current fund rather than 
trying to open a [sic] open-ended mutual fund." (Ex. DD.) 
As of August 1,2009, Coleman changed the name of the Regulation D fund to the Street 
Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, to reflect the name of Podesta's company. (Exs. A 
and FFF.) 
On August 4, 2009, Coleman sent an e-mail to Steven DuPont, which contains 
negotiations for DuPont's services. (Ex. D.)3 Podesta knew DuPont as someone who had 
substantial contacts in the financial industry worldwide and who Podesta had contacted as a 
potential source of investment capital for the open-ended fund. However, as of June, 2009, 
Podesta testified the open-ended fund idea was dead. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, L. 25 to p. 919, L. 5.) 
Consequently, Podesta contended at trial that Coleman's repeated references to the "fund" in Ex. 
D, had to be to the Street Search Fund. 
3 A copy of Ex. D is attached as Brief Ex. 1. 
Appellants' Brief, p. 7 
Soon thereafter, Profits Plus contracted with DuPont. (Ex. V.) However, while there is 
no mention in this contract ofthe "open-ended fund," there is a specific reference to the Street 
Search Fund. "If the Consultant is the procuring cause of a Client's [sic] becoming an 
investment advisory client of the Advisor through opening an account with the Street Search 
Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, the Advisor will pay 20% of the management fees and 
incentive fee paid by the client to the Advisor." (Ex. V, p. 1, para. 2.) (Emphasis added) 
Coleman asked Podesta to pay half of DuPont's required advance. (Ex. N.) 
Podesta testified the deal was an equal partnership interest in the "fund," whether it was 
the open-ended fund or the Street Search Fund. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 19-25.) 
Coleman sought and obtained Podesta's approval for compensation from the Street 
Search Fund to be paid to DuPont, which only a general partner is authorized to do. (Exs. A, B 
and D.) Coleman also promised DuPont an "equity stake" "in the company that is currently 
owned 50% by Jeff Podesta and 50% owned by Bob Coleman." (Ex. D.) (Emphasis added) 
That company could only be the Street Search Fund, as Podesta and Coleman were not 
associated in any other venture at this time. 
In June, 2009, Philip Wrigley, one of the heirs of the Wrigley chewing gum fortune, 
contacted Coleman about storing precious metals. Coleman sent Wrigley investment 
information regarding Coleman's Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, but as of August 10, 
2009, Wrigley was not interested in investing as he states clearly in Ex. T. 
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Coleman faced the same problems he had with his fund before, which led Coleman to 
contract Podesta; Coleman lacked the sophistication to close deals with "high net worth" clients 
as evidenced by Wrigley's apathetic reply to Coleman's initial contact. Fortunately, however, 
for Coleman, he had Podesta, and with Podesta's direction, guidance and nearly constant 
assistance to Coleman, Wrigley ultimately invested $25,000,000.00 in the Street Search Dollars 
and Sense Growth Fund, LP from the latter part of August, 2009, until March, 2010. (Coleman 
testified at trial that despite the clear content of Wrigley's reply e-mail, (Ex. T.), Coleman 
believed Wrigley, " ... was looking forward to investing in the fund." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 655, 
L. 7-l3.) 
In November, 2009, Coleman and Podesta traveled to Arizona to meet with Wrigley. 
Following that meeting, Coleman and Podesta exchanged several e-mails; including Ex. 00 in 
which Coleman discusses that he and Podesta "may need to talk to Phil and develop a plan for 
fees." Coleman also asks Podesta to review a letter Coleman wants to send to Wrigley in which 
Coleman states, "Jeff and I will provide the best service possible to meet you and your family's 
needs." (Ex. MM.) 
Podesta approved the letter, which Coleman ultimately sent to Wrigley. (Ex. PP.) 
Coleman then forwarded Wrigley's response to Podesta and again asked for Podesta's input and 
guidance to respond to Wrigley. (Ex. QQ.) 
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On November 12, 2009, Coleman sent Podesta an e-mail in which Coleman confirms he 
is sending Podesta his promised "share" (50%) of the management fees and incentive fees from 
Wrigley's investment. (Ex. RRl 
About this same time, Coleman is scrambling to find storage space. He desperately 
wants to build his own vault, and the vault he uses in Idaho is scheduled to close. On December 
22,2009, Coleman wrote to Podesta and stated Coleman is "discounting" Podesta's fees because 
"I am hoping to close on the [vault] building this week. The bank is requiring me to put more 
money down than first quoted." (Ex. xxl Coleman also told Podesta, "I wish to express my 
sincere appreciation for your dedication and expertise as we move forward growing the 
business." Id. (Emphasis added.) Although having a degree in accounting and finance, 
Coleman testified he believed he was ready to "close" on a vault building as of December, 
despite conceding he had not yet made a written offer on the building, had not obtained 
financing, nor even opened escrow at that time. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 766, L. 12 to p. 767, L. 10.) 
Coleman would not even sign a Purchase and Sale Agreement until April 19,2010, (Ex. EEE.), 
or over four months after he represented to Podesta in December that Coleman needed Podesta's 
money as Coleman was ready to "close" on the building. 
In March, 2010, Coleman and Podesta again exchange e-mails. (Exs. E6, F7, 0 8 and H9.) 
However, Judge Greenwood excluded Exs. E and H following a Motion in Limine. (R., p. 470.) 
4 A copy of Ex. RR is attached as Brief Ex. 2. 
5 A copy of Ex. XX is attached as Brief Ex. 3. 
6 A copy of Ex. E is in the Clerk's record pursuant to the Supreme Court's Order Granting Second Motion to 
Augment the Record dated April 26, 2013. A true and correct copy of Ex. E is also attached as Brief Ex. 4. 
7 A copy of Ex. F as admitted at trial is attached as Brief Ex. 5. 
8 A copy of Ex. G as admitted at trial is attached as Brief Ex. 6. 
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The Court then allowed a heavily redacted portion of Ex. H10 at trial. 
Podesta refused Coleman's attempt in Exs. Hand E to change the agreement and 
demanded compensation. Thereafter Coleman brought suit in Idaho for declaratory judgment, 
claiming despite his attempt to modity the contract with Street Search there was really no 
contract. (R., p. 25-30.) Podesta and Street Search answered and filed counterclaims. (R., p. 
79-100.) 
Initially, Coleman claimed the fund increased "quite a bit," after March 2010. (Tr., Vol. 
2, p. 728, L. 7-17.) Coleman then testified that he believed Wrigley only invested another 
$500,000.00 after March 2010, when Coleman breached his contract with Street Search and 
Podesta was no longer available to advise Coleman. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 729, L. 6-15.) Coleman 
acknowledged that after March, 2010, Wrigley's investment constituted 98% to 99% of the fund, 
but Coleman could not remember whether or not he had any other limited investors. Ultimately, 
Coleman conceded ifhe had any additional investors, those investments would have been 
"minimum and miniscule." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 823, L. 5-19.) While Coleman claimed the fund 
increased "quite a bit," Wrigley's subsequent $500,000.00 investment, assuming Coleman was 
telling the truth, constituted an increase of a mere 2% in growth between March 2010 and the 
date of trial in February 2012. Contrast that with the growth of the Street Search Fund from 
August, 2009, to March, 2010, of3,846% ($650,000 increased to $25,650,000) while Podesta 
was involved. 
9 A copy of Ex. H (un-redacted) is in the Clerk's record pursuant to the Supreme Court's Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record dated April 2, 2013. A true and correct copy of Ex. H is also attached as Brief Ex. 7. 
10 A copy of Ex. H as admitted at trial is attached as Brief Ex. 8. 
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A significant portion of this litigation involved Coleman's attempt to vilify Podesta by 
claiming Podesta lacked certain credentials or licenses, and therefore, any resulting contract with 
Coleman and Street Search was "illegal." In denying Coleman's attorney fees request in its 
entirety, the Trial Court found, "[r] ather than litigate on the merits Coleman spent an inordinate 
amount of time and effort on a wild goose chase concerning the status of Podesta's securities 
licenses and whether the licenses were necessary for him to enter into the alleged contract with 
Coleman." (R., p. 805, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees p. 9.) Judge 
Greenwood found Coleman's conduct was not reasonable and refused to approve the total 
amount of attorney fees requested. 
Issues Presented on Appeal. 
1. Whether the Trial Court erred when it denied Street Search and Podesta's Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction? 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to grant Street Search's Motion For New Trial 
according to LR.C.P. 60(b) after Street Search proved Coleman purposefully withheld 
relevant evidence requested through discovery and then lied about it during the trial? 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred in excluding evidence of Coleman's proposed contract 
modification in Exhibit E? 
4. Whether the Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed Street Search's fraud and 
constructive fraud claims? 
5. Whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to instruct the Jury regarding promissory 
estoppel? 
6. Whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to allow Street Search to prove its tort damages? 
7. Whether Street Search and Podesta are entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court erred when it denied Street Search and Podesta's Motion To Dismiss 
For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
"Jurisdiction is a question oflaw, Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 
(1995), over which we exercise free review, State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 
1097 (1998)." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007). 
On September 27,2010, according to LR.C.P. 4(i)(2), the Appellant's filed their Notice 
of Special Appearance To Contest Personal Jurisdiction. By filing their Notice of Special 
Appearance, the Appellants continued to contest jurisdiction, regardless of the Court's denial of 
their Motion to Dismiss, and therefore, they have preserved their objection to jurisdiction 
throughout this litigation and are entitled to review on appeal. 
Street Search and Podesta then filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 12, 2010, and 
asserted Idaho lacked personal jurisdiction over him or his company. (R., p. 33.) Podesta also 
filed an Affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss, (R., p. 36-43.), in which he testified Street 
Search is a New Jersey Limited Liability Company and that Podesta is a resident of New Jersey. 
Podesta testified that Coleman contacted Podesta by phone in 2008, and solicited Podesta's 
participation in Coleman's business ventures. 
The Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, a Delaware Limited Partnership, 
(Ex. A.), has never been registered in Idaho as a Foreign Limited Liability Partnership at any 
time relevant to this case. l1 
11 The Appellants asked the Court to take judicial notice of the documents related to the Foreign Limited Partnership 
and the Foreign Limited Liability Company filed with the Idaho Secretary of State. 
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Nor was Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, 
lawfully registered in Idaho as a foreign LLC at any time relevant to this case. The first time it 
was registered in Idaho was April 15, 2010. 
Podesta stated he was only physically in Idaho for one day in November, 2009, to meet 
with Coleman, at Coleman's request, to prepare for their trip to Arizona the following day to 
meet with Phil Wrigley, and was doing so in his capacity as a member of Street Search, LLC. 
A. The Respondents failed to prove the Appellants were conducting business in Idaho. 
In Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC., 143 Idaho 723,152 P.3d 594 (2007), the 
Supreme Court addressed the requirement for personal jurisdiction and discussed a two-part test. 
The proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants by an 
Idaho court involves satisfying two criteria. McAnally, 13 7 Idaho at 491, 50 P .3d 
at 986; St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. State of Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 742, 
852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993). First, the court must determine that the non-
resident defendant's actions fall within the scope of Idaho's long-arm statute. 
McAnally, 137 Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d 983. Second, the court must determine 
that exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant comports with 
the constitutional standards of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. (Emphasis added) 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC., 143 Idaho at 726. 
Respondents allege in their Verified Complaint: 
17. In order to further market the services and benefits of Dollars and Sense and 
its managing partner Profits Plus an independent contractor consulting agreement 
was entered into with either Street Search and or leffPodesta. (R., pp. 27-28) 
However, the Respondents fail to allege the "independent contractor" agreement was 
consummated in Idaho, or even negotiated in Idaho for that matter, or any facts surrounding this 
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supposed agreement. Moreover, neither of these entities; Dollars and Sense nor Profits Plus was 
lawfully conducting business in Idaho, so the alleged contract, assuming it existed, was not made 
with an Idaho entity. 
The Respondents also sought a declaration that neither Podesta nor Street Search had any 
ownership interest in the Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP. (R., p. 28.) 
Once again, however, the Respondents failed to allege any facts supporting application of 
Idaho's Long Arm Statute. All they assert is a New Jersey resident and a New Jersey LLC, are 
claiming an interest in a Delaware LP and a Delaware LLC. There are no allegations of fact that 
establish any foundation upon which to apply Idaho jurisdiction. 
Moreover, I.e. § 53-2-903, specifically identifies activities that do not constitute 
transacting business in Idaho. 
53-2-903. Activities not constituting transacting business. (1) Activities of a 
foreign limited partnership which do not constitute transacting business in this 
state within the meaning of this part 9 include: 
(a) Maintaining, defending, and settling an action or proceeding; 
(b) Holding meetings of its partners or carrying on any other activity 
concerning its internal affairs: 
*** 
(d) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange, and 
registration of the foreign limited partnership's own securities or 
maintaining trustees or depositories with respect to those securities; 
Contrary to the Trial Courts conclusion,12 merely having an office in Idaho or storing 
precious metals in depositories here does not constitute transacting business in Idaho. Moreover, 
a conflict regarding the determination as to ownership of a partnership interest falls under "any 
12 The Court's written Opinion is in the record at pp. 70-78. 
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other activities concerning its internal affairs." The very basis of this case, a claim for a general 
partnership interest and profits, concerns the "internal affairs" of the Limited Partnership, and 
therefore cannot be a basis for personal jurisdiction. 
While the Court refers to the Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, as an 
"Idaho Business," (R., p. 77.), in reality, the Fund is a Delaware business with an office in Idaho, 
and that Delaware business, until December 6, 2010, and well after any relevant date in this 
action, was not even lawfully registered in Idaho to conduct business. Moreover, even if the 
Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, was an "Idaho Business," neither Podesta nor 
Street Search was in any manner conducting business with the LP by asserting an ownership 
interest in the Fund. As neither Street Search nor Podesta was conducting business in Idaho, the 
Respondents have failed to establish application of the long-arm statute. If Idaho's long-arm 
statute does not apply, the Trial Court erred when it asserted personal jurisdiction over the 
Appellants. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction over either Podesta or Street Search in Idaho violates due process. 
"To ensure that exercise of specific jurisdiction comports with due process, the Plaintiffs 
must establish three requirements: (1) that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some affirmative act or conduct, 
(2) that the plaintiff's claim arise out of, or result from, the defendant's forum-related activities, 
and that the (3) exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable." Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 
620-21 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Under the "purposeful availment" prong, this Court must determine "whether the 
defendant's contacts with the forum are attributable to his own actions or are solely the action of 
the plaintiff." Roth, 942 F.2d at 621, citing Sinatra v. National Enquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 
(9th Cir. 1988). "This purposeful availment requirement insures that a defendant will not be 
hailed into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the 
unilateral activity of another party or third person." Roth, 942 F.2d at 621, quoting Burger King 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174,2183 (1985) . 
Podesta testified in his affidavit that the Respondents solicited the services of Street 
Search while he was in New Jersey, his home, and that but for Coleman's representations 
regarding their business relationship he would not have been in Idaho for any purpose. 
(R., p. 38. Podesta aff., para. 10.) Consequently, the very minimal contacts that the Appellants 
had with Idaho were based on the Respondents' requests and actions, not on the Appellants' 
voluntary conduct. Moreover, Podesta was in Idaho for one day because he believed his 
company Street Search had a 50% equity interest in the Street Search Fund. Podesta was never 
in Idaho for personal reasons. The Respondents, therefore, have failed to satisfy the "purposeful 
availment" prong. 
Regarding prong two, there is no proof "plaintiff's claim arises out of, or result from, the 
defendant's forum-related activities." Coleman filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss, (R., p. 52-58.), and in a section Coleman titled "Business Contacts in Idaho," (R., p. 
55.), Coleman lists facts which he claims prove that Podesta was "conducting business" in Idaho. 
However, in specific jurisdiction cases, the claim or dispute has to arise from the "forum-related 
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activities." Here Coleman claims Podesta contacted folks in Idaho about renting vault space, and 
therefore he was "conducting business." However, none of the claims in this case involve 
anything related to renting vault space or inspecting property. 
Furthermore, while Coleman claims Podesta was "communicating with potential 
investors [none of whom he identifies], (R., p. 55.), the claims at issue in this case do not arise 
from any of these alleged communications "with potential investors." 
Additionally, as argued above, a claim addressing the "internal affairs" of the LP does not 
constitute conducting business in Idaho. If the Appellants are not conducting business in Idaho 
as defined by statute, they have no "forum-related activities." 
Finally, the last prong, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, considered at 
the time a/the motion to dismiss, has five criteria. 
Once it had been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum 
contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other 
factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport 
with "fair play and substantial justice." Thus courts in "appropriate case[s]" may 
evaluate [1] "the burden on the defendant," [2] "the forum State's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute," [3] "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief," [4] "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies," and the [5] "shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social societies." These 
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction 
upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required .... 
Burger King, [105 S.Ct.], at 2184-2185. (citations omitted). 
Houghland Farms, Inc., v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 76, 803 P.2d 978,982 (1990). 
First, Podesta testified in his affidavit that it would be a financial burden for him to travel 
from the east coast to Idaho to defend this case. (R., p. 40.) Additionally, there is no interest for 
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Idaho to assert jurisdiction in a case involving a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and a 
Delaware Limited Partnership, versus a New Jersey Limited Liability Company and a New 
Jersey resident. l3 Moreover, Respondents should not be inconvenienced by litigation on the East 
Coast, as Coleman registered the LLC and LP in Delaware, not Idaho. Finally, the most efficient 
resolution of the parties' disputes involving residences or entities related to states on the east 
coast would appear to be on the east coast? 
The Trial Court erred when it denied the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction as neither Podesta nor Street Search were conducting business in Idaho, and 
asserting jurisdiction under these facts violates due process. Consequently, the Appellants 
request that this Court remand with direction to the Trial Court to vacate the judgment and enter 
an order dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
II. The Trial Court erred when it refused to grant Street Search's Motion For New Trial 
According To I.R.C.P. 60(b) after Street Search proved Coleman purposefully withheld 
relevant evidence requested through discovery and then lied about it during the trial. 
Coleman's conduct by refusing to obtain and disclose relevant licensing documents, but 
then representing that he had complied with discovery, constitutes the type of fraud, 
misrepresentation and misconduct that warrants a new trial. Street Search filed a motion for new 
trial according to LR.C.P. 60(b)(3), and (6), on August 14, 2012, (R., p. 828), after discovering 
Coleman has purposefully and intentionally withheld documents requested through discovery. 
Street Search filed an Affidavit in support of this Motion, (R., p. 832.), which included a copy of 
13 The Appellants have asked the Court to take judicial notice of the Idaho Secretary of State's documents related to 
registering the foreign LP and foreign LLC in Idaho. However, if the Court refused to take judicial notice, the 
Appellants believe it is the Respondents' burden to establish the LP or the LLC were registered in Idaho at times 
relevant to this case. 
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Coleman's discovery responses with Coleman's sworn verification the responses were accurate, 
and a supplemental affidavit on September 14, 2012. (R., p. 864.) Street Search also filed an 
affidavit of Marilyn Chastain, the Securities Bureau Chief for the Idaho Department of Finance. 
(R., p. 1009.) Then, Street Search filed a Reply Affidavit, (R., p. 1157.), and a supplemental 
reply affidavit. (R., p. 1183.) 
Street Search filed a public records request with the IDOF after the trial, when it had 
appeared at the trial an IDOF witness had reviewed documents that Coleman had not provided in 
discovery. In response to that request, the IDOF provided e-mails sent to and from Coleman 
dated in December, 2011, which was while discovery was ongoing in the underlying case. 
On December 13, 2011, Coleman sent the following e-mail to the IDOF in which he 
requested a "copy of my file." (R., p. 847.) 
:> ---Original Message----
> From: bob coleman [rnailto:bcolernan@goldsflvervault.coml 
> Sent: Tue :12/:13/201:1 8:09 PM 
> To: Patty Highley 
:> Subject: copy of file 
> 
> Patty, 
:> Is it possible to get a copy oT my file (filings, reports, etc) vvith 





:> Bob Coleman 
The next day Patty Highley, from the IDOF responded and she and Coleman exchanged e-mails 
throughout the day. 
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> On 12/14/201110:21 AM, Patty Highley wrote: 
»Hi Bob, 
» 
» I'm out of the office today. You'll need to be more specific on which filings you are talking about. Are you interested 
in certain filings made by your IA? If so, just let me know what those are. If you want everything you've ever filed with 
the Department you'II need to provide us a public records request which should be addressed to Marilyn Chastain. I 
hope to be in the office tomorrow morning but then will be out the remainder of the week. However, I can have 




Ms. Highley confirmed there is "quite a lot of information" in Coleman's file. (R., p. 936.) 
On 12/14/20112:33 PM, Patty Highley wrote: 
> Between your exam files and the IA file you will get quite a lot of information. It depends on what you need. We're 
happy to do either. 
> 
Then Coleman asked whether he should request the entire file, or just "pieces." (R., p. 936.) 
> ----Or-iginal Message-----
> From: bob coleman fmailto:bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com] 
> Sent: Wed 1.2/1.4/2011. 1.0:38 AM 
> To: Patty Highley 
> Subject: Re: copy of file 
> 
> would it be easier to ask for the entire file rather than pieces? 
> 
> Thanks 
> Bob Coleman 
Coleman also expresses his concern about anyone, which obviously includes Podesta and Street 
Search as Coleman is in litigation with them at this time, being able to get his IDOF file. 
(R., p. 936.) 
--Or-iginal Message--
From: bob coleman (mailto:bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com} 
Sent: Wed 1.2/1.4/201.1. 2:40 PM 
To: Patty Highley 
Subject: Re: copy of file 
can anyone request these files? or only me? 
Thanks 
Bob Coleman 
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Highley confinns that unless Coleman requests the infonnation, the IDOF only has to release 






Wednesday, December 14, 2011 4:32 PM 
bob coleman 
RE: copy of file 
We are able to give you anything you want related to your IA flies. Anyone else could make a public records request and 
be able to access only what we deem to be a public record. 
Ultimately, Coleman requests his entire file from the IDOF on December 23,2011, again while 






Follow Up Flag: 
Flag Status: 
Marilyn, 
bob coleman < profitsplus@cableone.net> 
Friday, December 23, 2011 8:50 AM 
Patty Highley; Marilyn Chastain 
Re: copy of file 
Follow up 
Flagged 
I would like to request all information that I have filed with your department. 
I also had some other questions regarding the Idaho statues. Could you or Patty please call me? 468-3600 Thanks Bob 
Coleman 
Profits Plus Capital Management 
Marilyn Chastain then confinned by letter, (R., p. 852.), and in her affidavit that although 
Coleman had requested a complete copy of his IDOF file, Coleman then withdrew that request 
after conferring with his "attomey.,,14 CR., p. 1010-11.) 
Coleman's trial tactic was to vilify Podesta by asserting there were discrepancies in 
Podesta's professional records, all the while touting Coleman's impeccable file. A mere five 
14 At about this same time, the parties had agreed to a Stipulation and Confidentially Order which the Court signed 
on December 9, 2011. Had Coleman obtained and produced the requested records, those records would have been 
protected from disclosure to anyone not associated with the case by the Confidentiality Agreement and Order. 
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minutes after taking the witness stand, Coleman claimed he had no client complaints and had 
fully complied with all licensing requirements. "I have a very clean and honest record." 
2. A. Maybe I could back up for a moment. 
3. In 2005 -- I've been in the business 
4. since 1992, and I don't have any client complaints 
5. on my record. I have a very clean and honest 
6. record. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 456, L. 2-6.) 
Coleman also refers to reviews by a "regulatory authority" and claims he has fully 
complied with all laws and regulations. 
[Coleman testifying] 
8. Q. Okay. And just summarize for the jury 
9. so we don't have to read through the whole form 
10. because they'll have it. Have you ever had a 
11. client file a grievance against you or any type of 
12. claim against you? 
13. A. Never. 
14. Q. And have you ever had a regulatory 
15. authority in any way sanction you, fine you, 
16. suspend you in anything? 
17. A. Never. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 876, L. 8 - 17.) 
Early on Day 3 of the trial, Coleman sought to introduce his U4 form. While the Court 
initially sustained a relevance objection, eventually Coleman's U4 form was admitted. (Ex. 22.) 
Mr. Gourley argued in support of admitting the document, "In addition, I think it is relevant 
because Mr. Coleman has testified as far as disclosures that he has to make as part of being part 
of Dollars & Sense Growth Fund and relation to his licenses. So we are going to talk about 
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disclosures that he [Coleman] made which go to his veracity." (Tr., p. 627, L. 23 to p. 628, L. 4.) 
In opposition to Appellants' Motion for New Trial, Coleman also sought and obtained an 
affidavit from Marilyn Chastain, which Coleman claimed clarified Mrs. Chastain's initial 
affidavit that Street Search filed in support of its LR.C.P. 60(b) Motion. (R., p. 1153.) Street 
Search then filed a second public records request and sought and obtained draft copies of the 
Affidavit Coleman's counsel had presented to Ms. Chastain for her approval. (R., p. 1164.) The 
language that Coleman proposed in a draft affidavit, which Mrs. Chastain removed, is 
compelling. (R., p. 1166, para. 6.) While Coleman testified at trial, "I have a very clean and 
honest record," Mrs. Chastain refused to confirm IDOF's audits or examinations involving 
Coleman "were concluded satisfactorily," as Coleman proposed in Ms. Chastain's draft 
Affidavit. Ms. Chastain modified Coleman's proposed language and removed the statement "All 
examinations were concluded satisfactorily to the Department," from her response. (R., p. 1155, 
para. 6.) 
After discovering that Coleman purposefully and intentionally refused to produce 
relevant evidence although requested in discovery, Street Search filed its Motion For New Trial. 
Judge Greenwood conducted a hearing on October 1, 2012, and that hearing transcript was 
prepared for appeal. (Motion For New Trial Hearing, Tr., p. 73 to 103.) Coleman, the only 
person authorized to obtain these records from the IDOF, opposed the motion for new trial but 
refused to provide any copies of the IDOF records to Judge Greenwood for his review. Judge 
Greenwood then issued his opinion on the record and denied the Motion for New Trial. (Motion 
For New Trial Hearing Tr., p. 104 to 110.) 
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A. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it refused to grant a new trial. 
It is undisputed Coleman asked the IDOF for his file while discovery was ongoing, which 
confirmed he and his counsel understood the information in the IDOF file, and in fact the very e-
mails Coleman was sending to the IDOF, were responsive to RFP. No. 27.15 Judge Greenwood, 
after reviewing the discovery requests, along with the definition sections of the Street Search 
discovery, stated that he would have granted a motion to compel after he concluded that the 
IDOF file and Coleman's e-mails were responsive to RFP No. 27. (Motion For New Trial 
Hearing Tr., p. 106, L. 21 to p. 107, L. 4.) However, the Court concluded it was Street Search's 
burden to bring Coleman's discovery abuses before the Court before the trial and then denied 
Street Search's motion. 
While the Court has discretion, it abuses that discretion if it "fails to act consistently with 
legal standards." Toddv. Sullivan Canst. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 121, 191 P.3d 196,199, (2008). 
In this instance, the legal standard is LR.C.P. 26( e). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
mandates a party has a duty to supplement discovery, and places that responsibility on the party 
holding the documents and information to disclose, as logically, that party knows if the 
information or documents exist and whether or not the documents are responsive to the request. 
Rule 26( e). Supplementation of responses 
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete 
when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include information thereafter 
acquired, except as follows: 
* * * 
15 RFP 27 and Coleman's response are in the record at p. 840. The "Definition" section of Defendants! 
Counterclaim ants ' Second Set of Discovery to Plaintiffs!Counterdefendants is in the record at pp. 1160-61. 
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(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if the party 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) the party knows that the response 
was incorrect when made, or (B) the party knows that the response though correct 
when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to 
amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 
* * * 
While Judge Greenwood acknowledges he would have granted a motion to compel if it 
was brought before trial, Judge Greenwood's ruling to deny the motion for new trial is contrary 
to LR.C.P. 26(e), which places the burden on the party responding to the discovery requests to 
act with honesty and integrity and produce the requested documents. By shifting the burden to 
the requesting party, this ruling actually supports and condones such discovery abuses. 
In Richardson v. State, 331 Mont. 231, 130 P.3d 634 (Mont., 2006), the Montana Supreme 
Court reversed a Trial Court's refusal to grant a new trial due to the State of Montana's 
discovery abuses. The Supreme Court ruled the abuses were so flagrant that it reversed and 
actually entered default judgment against the Defendant on the issue ofliability, notwithstanding 
the Defendant had finally provided the requested discovery just before trial. In ruling, the Court 
identified the purpose of discovery was to "promote the ascertainment of the truth .... ": 
"The purpose of discovery is to promote the ascertainment of truth and the 
ultimate disposition of the lawsuit in accordance therewith. Discovery fulfills this 
purpose by assuring the mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both 
parties which are essential to proper litigation." Massaro v. Dunham (1979), 184 
Mont. 400,405,603 P.2d 249,252 (citing Hickman v. Taylor (1947),329 U.S. 
495,507,67 S.Ct. 385, 392, 91 L.Ed. 451). Modem instruments of discovery, 
together with pre-trial procedures, "make a trial less a game of blind man's buff 
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest 
practicable extent." United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1958),356 U.S. 677, 
682, 78 S.Ct. 983,986-87,2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 
S.Ct. at 388-89). 
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Richardson v. State, 130 P.3d at 640. 
Obviously, there can never be a "fair contest" when one party disregards its duty to 
disclose relevant information and then exploits that non-disclosure to its benefit at trial. The 
Montana Supreme Court acknowledges this reality and confirms its belief that only swift and 
painful retribution will prevent such abuses. 
This Court strictly adheres to the policy that dilatory discovery actions shall 
not be dealt with leniently. Morris v. Big Sky Thoroughbred Farms, 1998 MT 
229, ~ 13,291 Mont. 32, ~ 13, 965 P.2d 890, ~ 13 (citing Owen v. F.A. Buttrey 
Co. (1981), 192 Mont. 274,278,627 P.2d 1233, 1235). As we have said, the trial 
courts, and this Court on review, must remain intent upon punishing transgressors 
rather than patiently encouraging their cooperation. Morris, ~ 13 (citing Owen, 
192 Mont. at 278, 627 P.2d at 1235). Accordingly, the imposition of sanctions for 
failure to comply with discovery procedures is regarded with favor. Schuff, ~ 71 
(citing McKenzie, 285 Mont. at 506, 949 P.2d at 1172). "It is, after all, a maxim 
of our rules of discovery that the price for dishonesty must be made 
unbearable to thwart the inevitable temptation that zealous advocacy 
inspires." Schuff, ~ 71 (citing generally Eisenmenger v. Ethicon, Inc. (1994), 264 
Mont. 393,406,871 P.2d 1313,1321; Owen, 192 Mont. at 280,627 P.2d at 
1236). 
Richardson v. State, 130 P.3d at 646. (Emphasis added.) 
Street Search asks this Court to adopt a similar policy as that applied by the Montana 
Supreme Court. Anything less actually condones and promotes discovery abuses, which 
ultimately and unquestionably deny the litigating parties a fair trial. 
B. Street Search is entitled to a new trial according to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). 
The first section of LR.C.P. 60(b) provides for relief in the original action, and 
specifically in section (b)(3), when a party establishes "fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
as intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Section 
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(b) ( 6) also provides relief for" ... any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." 
Applying the fraud standard, Coleman made false statements (verified under oath) in 
discovery that he had provided all documents responsive to Street Search's discovery requests. 
(R., pp. 838-843.) Those statements were not true. The statements were material and Street 
Search had a right to rely on these statements; first, because Coleman verified the responses as 
accurate and complete, and second, the discovery responses were also signed by Coleman's 
counsel according to LR.C.P. 26(f). However, Coleman obviously knew the statements were 
false as he was aware the IDOF had documents that were responsive to the discovery request and 
he wanted Street Search to rely on the representations that Coleman had provided all of the 
requested documents. Street Search had no way of knowing that Coleman's representations were 
false, and relied, and had a right to rely, on Coleman's representations as he had verified his 
answers under oath, and his counsel also certified the responses were correct. Street Search also 
had a right to rely that Coleman would supplement his discovery responses according to LR.C.P. 
26(e) ifhe obtained additional information. 
As ruled in State ex ref. Symms v. V-J Oil Co., 94 Idaho 456, 490 P.2d 323 (1971), once a 
party establishes fraud, the damages are presumed. "We will not attempt to weigh the effect of 
the fraud upon the verdict; rather, the mere existence of fraud, taken together with the probability 
of influence resulting therefrom, is sufficient to require vacation of the judgment and a new 
trial." State ex ref. Symms v. V-J Oil Co., 94 Idaho at 458. As Coleman undoubtedly committed 
fraud by purposefully concealing relevant documents, but then asserting under oath that he had 
Appellants' Brief, p. 28 
provided all document responsive to Street Search's discovery requests, Street Search is entitled 
to a new trial. 
Street Search incorporates all of the facts and arguments stated above to establish 
Coleman made misrepresentations and committed misconduct that warrants a new trial, the other 
criteria found under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). While Coleman testified at trial he had "a clean and 
honest record," the IDOF Bureau Chief stated otherwise. Coleman also hid the fact he requested 
his entire licensing file from the IDOF and then withdrew that request. Considering this case 
involved an oral contract, and hinged upon who the jury believed was more credible, it is hard to 
imagine the revelation to the jury that Coleman refused to produce his complete IDOF file would 
have had a positive effect on his credibility, especially in light of his sworn testimony. By 
misrepresenting and implying Coleman was completely honest and forthright regarding the 
disclosure of his licensing documents, Coleman and his counsel misled the jury. This direct and 
purposeful discovery abuse appears to fall squarely in the category of "misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party," that would also warrant a new trial. 
When Coleman decided, after discussions with this counsel, to withdraw his request for 
this IDOF file, and then to refuse to disclose his e-mail communications with the IDOF; which 
included his request for his "entire file," his questions about whether anyone else (assuming 
Podesta) could access his file, and his subsequent withdrawal ofthat request, Coleman's conduct 
amounted to a purposeful, deliberate and calculated refusal to provide the documents requested 
in RFP No. 27. Such discovery abuse should not go unpunished and Street Search is entitled to a 
new trial. 
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c. Street Search and Podesta are entitled to a New Trial according to I.R.c.P. 60(b)(6). 
There does not appear to be a clear case in Idaho delineating the type of discovery abuses 
and deceptions that occurred here as falling specifically under LR.C.P. 60(b)(3). Consequently, 
as LR.C.P. 60(b)(6) also appears to be applicable under the circumstances, Street Search argues 
that Coleman's conduct discussed above also warrants a new trial under Section 6. 
InPrintcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P.3d 757 
(2012), the Supreme Court suggests, although without specifically stating, the "unique and 
compelling circumstances" standard applies when considering a motion brought under Rule 
60(b )(6). ("We [the Idaho Supreme Court] have generally, but sparingly applied it [the unique 
and compelling circumstances standard] where a party seeks relief under Rule 60(b)( 6).") 
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc, 153 Idaho at 450. 
Street Search and Podesta incorporate their facts and arguments stated earlier in support 
of relief under LR.C.P. 60(b)(3) and now argue that these same facts establish unique and 
compelling circumstances warranting a new trial under this section. Coleman knew Street 
Search requested through discovery and was entitled to obtain and review Coleman's complete 
IDOF file. Accordingly, Coleman made the request for his complete file with the IDOF. 
However, unaccountably, and without any disclosure through discovery, Coleman withdrew the 
request and never obtained his file. Then at trial, Coleman asserted the Jury should believe he 
was credible because, "I have a very clean and honest record." The reality, however, is either 
Coleman has no idea what is in his file with the IDOF because he never obtained a copy, or 
Coleman knew exactly what was in his IDOF file, but did not want Street Search, Podesta or the 
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Jury to have that information. Clearly, unique and compelling circumstances exist where a party 
purposefully engages in discovery abuses and then exploits that conduct to his advantage at trial. 
Moreover, if a party purposefully abuses its responsibility to provide full, complete, 
accurate and timely discovery responses during the discovery phase of the litigation, and suffers 
no liability for such conduct when discovered after the trial, then again such a ruling actually 
promotes deception and non-disclosure during discovery. The "we really did not understand that 
is what you wanted," defense, if allowed, undermines the purpose of discovery, which is full and 
accurate disclosure. 
The reality, all that granting an LR.C.P. 60(b) motion does is place the parties back on 
equal footing, thereby negating the unfair advantage the victor [Coleman] gained by his fraud, 
misrepresentation and misconduct. Podesta and Street Search are undoubtedly entitled to the 
discovery of Coleman's entire IDOF file, as Coleman conceded because he requested it from the 
IDOF. Moreover, Coleman's conduct denied Podesta and Street Search the opportunity to cross-
examine Coleman regarding the contents of the IDOF file in front of a Jury or to impeach him 
with the fact that although he requested the file, Coleman subsequently withdrew that request 
and therefore really had no idea what was in his record. The only way to remedy a verdict 
obtained by Coleman's unfair advantage is to order a new trial. When that happens, the playing 
field will be leveled. If that does not happen, then Coleman and his counsel will have benefited 
from his fraud and misconduct and justice undoubtedly will not have been achieved. 
III. The Trial Court erred in excluding evidence of Coleman's proposed contract 
modification. (Ex. E.) 
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A trial court's rulings on a motion in limine, a motion to amend the pleadings to 
add a claim for punitive damages, and a motion to amend the pleadings pursuant 
to Rule 15(b) are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 
Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937,943 (2007) (motion in limine); Gunter v. Murphy's 
Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,29, 105 P.3d 676,689 (2005) (punitive damages); 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 484,129 P.3d 1223,1233 (2006) (Rule l5(b». 
A court abuses its discretion if it fails to act consistently with legal standards. 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568,165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007). 
Todd v. Sullivan Canst. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 121, 191 P.3d 196, 199, (2008). 
A. The Trial Court erred when it granted Coleman's Motion in Limine as Coleman's 
contract (Ex. E) was not an offer in compromise to settle a claim, but merely an attempt 
to modify an existing contract. 
On March 2, 2010, Podesta contacted Coleman via e-mail and asked for payment of the 
management fees that were due to Podesta. (Ex. F, bottom section.) Coleman responded as 
indicated in the upper section of Ex. F. Podesta then responded in Ex. G. The communication 
continued as expressed in the original and un-redacted copy of Ex. H. Below is the portion of 
Ex. H that the Court redacted at trial. The Court also excluded the portion of Ex. H that 
contained Podesta's response e-mail. 
The "following attachment" referred to Street Search's Ex. E, which was Coleman's 
proposal to modify his agreement with Podesta, and which the Court had ruled was inadmissible 
as an offer in compromise during the Motion in Limine hearing. 
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This contr:!':I 
(Ex. E.) 
'!I \"1 1 
.\ .. !l1 
Coleman's proposed modification "contract" was extremely damaging to Coleman's 
case as Coleman was acknowledging a contractual relationship with Street Search well beyond 
the "independent contractor" relationship he claimed in pleadings and at trial. Consequently, 
Coleman filed a motion in limine and sought to exclude Exs. E and H according to LR.E. 408. 
(Motion, R., p. 470, which included an affidavit in support, (R., p. 478.) and copies ofExs. E 
(R., p. 515.) and H (R., p. 516-7). Podesta responded with a brief on January 12,2012, and 
argued the Court must allow the exhibits as the contents directly contracted the allegations in 
Coleman's Verified Complaint there was merely an independent contractor relationship, and 
second the proposed contract was an attempt to modify the existing agreement not a proposed 
settlement. (R., p. 553.) That motion was heard January 19, 2012, and the parties' arguments 
and the Judge's ruling were transcribed on appeal. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 161, L. 22 to p. 172, L. 2.) 
Judge Greenwood ruled to exclude Exs. E and H according to LR.E. 408. 
LR.E. 408 should apply only where parties are concluding their relationships and 
terminating their respective claims. Conversely, the rule should not apply when the parties are 
negotiating terms for a continuing relationship, as Coleman admits in the original version of 
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Ex. H. "I would like to continue to work with you, however, [we need to modify the existing 
agreement]. ... " 
The reality, Coleman was not attempting to compromise a disputed claim, but wanted 
Podesta to agree to change and modify an obligation Coleman conceded already existed. 
Coleman sought to pressure Podesta into agreeing to modify an existing contract by withholding 
funds Coleman admitted he owed, not to "compromise a disputed claim." It is not a proper 
exercise of reason to apply Rule 408 under these circumstances, where l.R.E. 408 is used to hide 
nothing less than extortion. 
B. Coleman offered no valuable consideration. 
In Ex. E Coleman admits that he already owes fees to Podesta and is only offering to pay 
the fees Coleman concedes he already owes. Consequently, although Coleman claims Ex. E is 
an offer in compromise," it is not. Coleman offers no "valuable consideration," as he wants 
Podesta to agree to less than Podesta already has. Moreover, Coleman concedes in Ex. E he 
owes Podesta money, and therefore, all Coleman is offering it to deliver money he admits he 
owes to Podesta; but, only if Podesta agrees to Coleman's extortion. (Ex. E.) (Emphasis added) 
amount equals the sum of the 
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LR.E. 408 specifically requires the offer of "a valuable consideration" before a 
communication constitutes an "offer in compromise." 
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise. 
Evidence of (I) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, 
offering, or promising to accept, a. valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the 
claim or any other claim .... 
To properly exercise its discretion, the Trial Court must "act consistently with legal 
standards." Here the "legal standard" is LR.E. 408, which requires an offer to contain "valuable 
consideration." Accordingly, a Court does not act consistently with the legal standard ifit 
concludes LR.E. 408 applies when the offer contains no "valuable consideration," just an 
acknowledgment of an existing obligation. Again, there is a bright line between an offer in 
compromise and extortion, and LR.E. 408 should not be applied to conceal the latter. 
c. Excluding Ex. E and redacting Ex. H was extremely prejudicial to Street Search and 
that prejudice was not harmless. 
Excluding Ex. E was highly prejudicial to Street Search. If Podesta and Street Search 
were merely independent contractors as Coleman claimed, then why would Coleman need to 
"terminate" "agreements and/or arrangements" "regarding all aspects including all rights, 
obligations, responsibilities, and revenue from the Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, 
LP" as he is proposing in this contract? If Coleman believed Podesta was merely an independent 
contractor, as he testified at trial, then Coleman could have just terminated the independent 
contractor agreement he had with Steven DuPont, as Coleman did in Ex. LL. 
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Ex. E proves that Coleman believed a contract existed with Street Search that addressed 
"all aspects including all rights, obligations, responsibilities, and revenue from the Street Search 
Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP," because he is attempting to "terminate" that agreement in 
Ex. E. Not only did Ex. E impeach Coleman's credibility, it corroborated Street Search's 
contention the agreement included much more than Podesta being merely an independent 
contractor. When considered with Coleman's statements in Ex. D; "Upon raising $35 million 
you would be entitled to a 15% equity stake in the company that is currently owned 50% by Jeff 
Podesta and 50% owned by Bob Coleman," and Coleman's admission in Ex. H, "We were to 
share the net fees on capital we both raised," Ex. E confirmed Street Search's contention that 
Street Search and Profits Plus were equal partners in the Street Search Fund. 
The reality, by getting the Trial Court to exclude Ex. E and to heavily redact Ex. H, 
Coleman was allowed to lie to the Jury about the true nature of the contractual relationship with 
Street Search. Street Search and Podesta were therefore denied a fair trial. 
IV. The Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed the Appellants' fraud and 
constructive fraud claims. 
Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider an alleged error on appeal 
unless a timely objection to the alleged error was made at trial. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010); LR.E. l03(a)(1). For an objection to be 
preserved for appellate review, "either the specific ground for the objection must 
be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context." 
Slack, 140 Idaho at 921, 104 P.3d at 963; LR.E. 103(a)(1). The only exception to 
this rule is when plain error occurs as LR.E. 103 does not "preclude[] taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought 
to the attention of the court." LR.E. 1 03( d). 
Hansen v. Roberts, Docket No. 38904, p. 3 (2013). 
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A. The Trial Court failed to make a record of its decision to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of the 
Appellants' Counterclaim. 
During the jury instruction conference, the Trial Court declared that it was dismissing 
Counts 2 and 3 of the Appellants' Counterclaim and memorialized its decision in Jury Instruction 
16, wherein the Court stated Street Search's remaining claims to the Jury, but specifically 
excluded Street Search's claims for fraud and constructive fraud. Upon review of the the trial 
transcripts, however, the Appellants, although believing Judge Greenwood had put his decision 
on the record, discovered he had not. The Appellants then filed a motion with the District Court 
asking the Court to memorialize its decision to dismiss the Appellants' fraud claims on the 
record. 16 During the April 10,2013 Motion For Written Order hearing, Judge Greenwood stated 
that the Court believed it had made a record of that decision. 
[Judge Greenwood] 
1. So, I agree that the issues of -- I'm trying to 
2. remember. It was some of the fraud issues. 
3. MR. CLARK: Correct. Dismissal. 
4. JUDGE GREENWOOD: That those were -- I thought we 
5. had done that on the record, but --
6. MR. CLARK: I did, too, Your Honor. 
7. 
(April 10, 2013 Hearing Tr., p. 9, L. 1-6.) 
The Court also confirmed that if it believed it had authority to act, it would have done so 
as follows: 
[Judge Greenwood] 
8. I do my best to try and do that, but -- and 
9. frankly, if we were within the time limits of Rule 29, I 
16 The Defendants' Motion For Written Order Re: Dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 of the Amended Counterclaim and is 
part of the Clerk's Record on Appeal according to Supreme Court Order dated May 21, 2013. 
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10. would do something. I'm not sure what. But I would enter 
11. an order that says that I declined to give instructions on 
12. these two issues, because I did not believe the evidence 
13. sustained them. 
14. But I'm not going to enter such a record at this 
15. date, because I don't think I have jurisdiction to do so. 
16. And I wish I did, Mr. Clark, but I don't think I do. And 
17. so, I am constrained to follow the rules as I see them. 
(April 10, 2013 Hearing Tr. p. 24, L. 8-17.) (Emphasis added) 
Judge Greenwood denied the Appellants' Motion based on LA.R. 29. 17 
The Appellants then filed a Motion to Remand with the Supreme Court asking this Court 
to Remand the case with direction to the District Court to memorialize its decision on the record. 
In their Motion to Remand, the Appellants argued the Trial Court had authority to correct 
its oversight and make a record according to LA.R. 13. The Appellants also cited to H & V 
Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 
646, 747 P.2d 55 (Idaho), in which the Court ruled, "[0 ]nce the proceedings are stayed by appeal, 
the district court ordinarily is divested of jurisdiction to act in any manner (with relation to the 
rights and liabilities of an appellant) except to act in aid of and not inconsistent with the 
appeal." H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers and Land 
Surveyors, 113 Idaho at 648. (Emphasis added.) The Appellants also filed an Affidavit in 
support of the Motion to Remand, which included a complete copy of the April 10, 2013 hearing 
transcript. 
While it would appear to constitute good cause to remand to the District Court to 
17 The Court's Order is part of the Clerk's Record on Appeal according to Supreme Court Order dated May 21, 
2013. 
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memorialize a ruling on the record the Trial Court believed it had made, but had not, this Court 
denied the Motion to Remand. Perhaps the Court believed remanding was not necessary as Jury 
Instruction 16, (R., p. 665.), confinns the Trial Court refused to allow the Appellant's fraud 
claims. This Court also could have concluded as the Appellants now argue that it was plain error 
for Judge Greenwood to have dismissed Counts 2 and 3 and there is a sufficient record to 
establish that error as Judge Greenwood stated what his ruling would have been during the 
April 10,2012 hearing. 18 
LR.C.P. 51(a)(1) requires the Court to make a record of its decisions regarding jury 
instructions . 
... The duplicate copy shall also contain blank spaces at the bottom thereof 
identified as "Given," "Refused," "Modified," "Covered," and "Other." The court 
shall rule upon such requests at the close of the evidence at the trial and shall 
verbally indicate its ruling on the record or shall indorse upon the duplicate 
copy of each requested instruction the court's ruling as to such request in the 
blanks provided .... (Emphasis added) 
During the April 10, hearing Appellants' counsel inquired whether the Court had 
"indorsed" its ruling on the duplicate copies of the fraud-related jury instructions, because there 
were no copies in the Clerk's file. Judge Greenwood stated the Court did not keep the proposed 
instructions. 
6. JUDGE GREENWOOD: Well, that's the problem. We 
7 didn't keep the proposed jury instructions. And we should 
8 have. 
18 The Appellants are mindful of the Court's recent decision in Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 288 P.3d 821 (2012). 
However, Street Search contends it as done everything possible to memorialize the Court's decision to dismiss 
Counts 2 and 3. 
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(April 10, 2013 Hearing Tr., p. 16, L. 6-8.) 
B. I.R.c.P. Sl(b) is unconstitutional if applied to dismiss a claim. 
There clearly are separate and distinct standards for directing a verdict and for instructing 
a jury, and subsequently, for review on appeal of such decisions. Upon review of a directed 
verdict, the reviewing Court conducts a free review of the decision. "In conducting this review, 
'we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, 
viewing as true all adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for a directed verdict'." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 565, 
272 P.3d 534,357 (2012). Additionally, " ... this Court 'must determine whether, admitting the 
truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the 
opposing party, there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury'." 
Vendelin v. Costeo Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,430,95 P.3d 34, 48 (2004). The standard 
of review on appeal is free review, with no deference to the Trial Court's decision below. "This 
Court exercises free review [when considering review of a directed verdict] and does not defer to 
the findings of the trial court." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho at 562. 
Contrast the directed verdict standards with the standards for giving or refusing to give 
jury instructions. 
An instruction is not to be given if it is an erroneous statement of the law, not 
supported by the facts, or adequately covered by the other instructions. Id. Jury 
instructions are to be viewed as a whole in determining whether the jury was 
properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law. Alderson v. Bonner, 142 
Idaho 733, 744, 132 P.3d 1261, 1272 (Ct.App.2006). An erroneous instruction 
does not constitute reversible error when the instructions taken as a whole do not 
mislead or prejudice a party. Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C., 142 Idaho at 800, 134 
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P.3d at 651. Reversible error occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or 
prejudices a party. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51,995 
P.2d 816, 821 (2000) (citing Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462,886 
P.2d 330, 338 (1994)). However, the determination of whether the instruction 
is supported by the facts is committed to the discretion of the district court. 
Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C., 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651 (citing State v. 
Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P.3d 483, 489 (2001)). 
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261,269 (2007). (Emphasis 
added) 
There is a substantial difference between a ruling the evidence did not support a "claim" 
and thereby directing a verdict, and a ruling the evidence did not support a proposed instruction. 
This distinction is critical when the jury instruction is an element instruction, which obviously 
contains the elements of a particular claim. Consequently, a ruling not to give an element 
instruction is an ipso facto ruling the evidence did not support the claim, and results in a directed 
verdict on that claim. I.R.C.P. 51 (b) is therefore unconstitutional if applied to assert a Trial 
Court possesses authority to weigh evidence and subsequently dismiss a claim by refusing to 
give a jury instruction. Such a plain error is reversible on appeal, regardless of a timely 
objection. 
A Court is not authorized to weigh the evidence when considering whether to direct a 
verdict against a party, but must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. That standard applies because the Appellants had requested a jury trial and were 
entitled to have a Jury, not the Court, consider evidence in support of Counts 2 and 3 according 
the Idaho's Constitutional right to a jury trial. 19 However, the jury instruction review standard 
19 Article 1, Sec. 7. 
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allows a court to weigh evidence and affords deference to that decision on appeal, which directly 
conflicts with the standard for directed verdict. As a result, if a Court were allowed to dismiss a 
claim simply by refusing to give a jury instruction as provided in I.R.C.P. 51(b), such conduct 
would deny a party their constitutionally protected right to a jury trial on all claims because the 
Judge not the Jury weighed and determined the facts. Such conduct would also constitute plain 
error. 
If as Judge Greenwood stated above, the Court believed the evidence did not support the 
claim, the Trial Court has directed a verdict on that claim. If the Court has directed a verdict, the 
Appellants are entitled to that standard of review on appeal, with no deference to the Trial 
Court's findings below. 
Additionally, as the Trial Court had directed verdict on the fraud claims, there was no 
obligation to object according to LR.C.P. 51(b) to the Court's refusal to give jury instructions 
related to Counts 2 and 3 as those Counts had been dismissed. It would be nonsensical to require 
a party to offer jury instructions and object to the refusal to give jury instructions related to a 
dismissed claim. Furthermore, the Court, in dismissing a claim by refusing to give a jury 
instruction is asserting authority it does not possess, which is plain error. There is no duty to 
object when the Trial Court has committed plain error. 
Moreover, for the sake of argument if somehow a duty to object to jury instructions 
related to a dismissed claim exists, the duty to object according to LR.C.P. 51(b) does not arise 
unless the Trial Court has first complied with I.R.C.P. 51(a)(1) . 
. . .. The court shall rule upon such requests at the close of the evidence at the trial 
and shall verbally indicate its ruling on the record or shall indorse upon the 
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duplicate copy of each requested instruction the court's ruling as to such request in 
the blanks provided .... 
I.R.C.P. 51 (a)(1) is mandatory; either the Court makes a written record of its decisions 
regarding proposed jury instruction or it must do so verbally on the record. I.R.C.P.51(a)(1) 
also establishes it is the Trial Court's affirmative duty to make a record of its jury instruction 
decisions, not counsel's duty to inquire or object. 
Judge Greenwood confirmed on April! 0,2013 that the Court had not made a written 
record, except in Jury Instruction No. 16, and there is no verbal record regarding the Court's 
decision to dismiss Counterclaim Counts 1 and 2. Again, the Court's conduct not only in 
dismissing these claims, but in failing to make its record is plain error. 
C. Street Search established facts at trial to support its fraud and constructive fraud 
claims. 
Coleman filed proposed jury instructions that included element instructions for Street 
Search's Constructive Fraud and Fraud claims (Plaintiffs' /Counterdefendants' Proposed Jury 
Instruction Nos. 40, 42, and 43.) On January 23,2012, Podesta filed his "Objection/ 
NonObjections" to the Plaintiffs' proposed instructions. (R., p. 594-98.) Podesta did not object 
to Plaintiffs' Proposed instruction Nos. 40, 42 and 43.20 
In this case Street Search provided substantial, if not compelling evidence to support each 
element of its fraud and constructive fraud claim. In light of the standard for directed verdict 
stated above in Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 272 P.3d 534 (2012) and Vendelin 
20 The Plaintiffs and Defendants' proposed Jury instructions are in the Clerk's record according to Supreme Court 
Order dated April 26, 2013. 
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v. Costco Wholesale COlp., 140 Idaho 416,95 P.3d 34 (2004) that the Court must consider this 
evidence as true and then draw all reasonable inferences in Street Search's favor, the Trial Court 
erred when it dismissed Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud claims. 
1. Profits Plus/Coleman made statements to Podesta/Street Search. Podesta testified 
Coleman promised equal equity in the fund and in the fees generated. 
1. A. The terms of the contract were 50 
2. percent of the management fees, 50 percent of the 
3. incentive fees, and then half the valuation of the 
4. fund if and when we would ever sell it or merge it 
5. with any other acquiring company. 
6. Q. Let's make sure we are talking about 
7. the same things so that a jury comprehends your 
8. testimony. We are dealing with 50 percent of the 
9. general partner interest; is that correct? 
10. A. Correct. 
11. Q. And 50 percent of the management fees 
12. and 50 percent of the incentive fees? 
13. A. Correct. 
14. Q. Isn't it correct that those are the 
15. terms that you are alleging exist in relation to 
16. this oral contract? 
17. A. No. 50 percent ownership in the fund 
18. and in the operation. 
19. Q. And explain what you mean by 50 percent 
20. ownership of the fund. Is it different than a 
21. general partner interest? 
22. A. He [Coleman] promised me 50 percent of the fund 
23. and 50 percent of the interest in the fund and in 
24. any project or any situation that we were working 
25. on. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 1-25.) 
Podesta also testified he believe that "splitting-equity" agreement addressed all projects, 
including ultimately Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 911, L. 
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3-8.) and (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 915, L. 7 to p. 916, L. 1.). 
Coleman then confirmed the equal-equity deal in an e-mail on August 4, 2009. Coleman 
and Podesta were negotiating with DuPont in July and August 2009, and on August 4,2009, 
Coleman sent the following e-mail to DuPont, with a courtesy copy of the e-mail to Podesta. 
(Ex. D). 
Podesta testified he understood Coleman's reference to the "fund" in Ex. D meant the 
Street Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, not the open-ended fund, as that was a dead 
issue at this point. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, L. 11 to p. 919, L. 12.) 
Specifically, Podesta testified he understood Coleman's reference in paragraph 2, where 
Coleman says" ... you would be entitled to a 15% equity stake in the company that is currently 
owned 50% by Jeff Podesta and 50% owned by Bob Coleman," was to the Street Search Fund. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 930, L. 10 to p. 931, L. 20.) Podesta also testified that Coleman represented he 
would change the paperwork to memorialize the agreement that Street Search was a general 
partner in the Street Search Fund. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 931, L. 21 to p. 935, L. 24.) 
2. These statements were false. Coleman denied any contractual relationship related to 50% 
ownership in his Verified Complaint and at trial. Coleman repeatedly testified that Podesta was 
merely an independent contractor, just like Du Pont, who was only entitled to compensation if 
someone Podesta introduced then invested in the Street Search Fund. Coleman also claimed his 
agreement with Podesta provided Podesta received 20% of the management fees. 
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3. The statements were material. Podesta testified he would not have expended his time and 
effort for merely minimal fees. "Everything was 50/50 to keep me involved." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 
915, L. 7 to p. 916, L. 1.) 
4. Profits PluslColeman knew the statements were false. Coleman claimed he was actually 
referring to both the Street Search Fund and the open-ended fund in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Ex. D. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 643, L. 9 to p. 647, L. 8.) 
Coleman also claimed Podesta was never a partner and merely an independent contractor 
just like Steven DuPont. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 658, L. 15-20.) While Coleman executed a written 
"Consulting Agreement," with Du Pont, Ex. 37, there was no such similar agreement with 
Podesta or Street Search. Additionally, Coleman acknowledged his agreement he and Podesta 
were to "share the fees." (Ex. H. (Redacted)). Coleman also confirmed that according to the the 
Street Search Fund documents, (Exs. A and B), only general partners are entitled to negotiate 
fees. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 839, L. 1 to p. 840, L. 1.) 
Finally, in Exhibit YY,21 Coleman again confirms he was only referring to the Street 
Search Fund in Ex. D. (Ex. YY is Coleman's e-mail to Du Pont in which Coleman specifies he 
understood that Du Pont was raising money for the Street Search Fund only.) 
5. Street Search did not know the statements were false. Podesta relied on Coleman's 
promise to finish the general partner paperwork referenced in paragraph 3, of Ex. D, and did not 
know until March 2010 that Coleman had not completed that promised paperwork. (Tr., Vol. 3, 
p. 1406, L. 15 to p. 1407, L. 11.) 
21 A copy of Ex. YY is attached as Brief Ex. 9. 
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6. Coleman/Profits Plus intended for Street Search to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated. Coleman told DuPont in Ex. D that Podesta 
owned 50%, and then Coleman paid Podesta the promised 50% of the management and incentive 
fees and confirmed the payment in an e-mail dated November 12, 2009. (Ex. RR.) Then in 
December Coleman discounts the fees to "20% of the gross management fees" and explains he 
was doing so because he was incurring costs to "close" on the [new vault] building?2 (Exhibit 
XX.) Coleman also tells Podesta in Ex. XX, "1 wish to express my sincere appreciation for your 
dedication and expertise as we move forward growing the business." (Emphasis added.) 
7. Street Search did rely upon the truth of the statement. Again, Podesta relied on 
Coleman's promise Street Search was 50% owner in the Street Search Fund and that Coleman 
would finish the general partner paperwork referenced in paragraph 3, of Ex. D, and did not 
know until March, 2010, that Coleman had not completed that paperwork. (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1406, 
L. 15 to p. 1407, L. 11.) 
8. Street Search's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances. Podesta and 
Coleman had an ongoing business relationship since February 2009 and Coleman admitted their 
communication was almost "constant." (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 844, L. 14, to p. 845, L. 2.) And, once 
again Coleman admitted in the Street Search Fund paperwork, only the General Partner had 
authority to determine fee structures. (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 837, L. 24 to p. 840, L. 1.) However, in 
22 Coleman conceded at trial that in December, he had not submitted a Purchase and Sale Contract, nor obtained 
financing for the purchase as of December,2009, but he was representing to Podesta Coleman was ready to close on 
the building then. 
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Ex. D, Coleman concedes he and Jeff Podesta are the two who are determining DuPont's 
reasonable compensation-decisions made only by general partners of the fund. 
Then, in Exhibit 00, Coleman's e-mail to Jeffregarding Mr. Wrigley, Coleman again 
confirms that Jeffs role is in the decision-making process regarding what fees to charge 
Wrigley. Additionally, Coleman paid Podesta the promised 50% management and incentive 
fees. (Ex. RR.) Coleman drafted and delivered Ex. D to Podesta, which establishes what 
Podesta believed, that he was a 50% owner of the Street Search Fund. 
Podesta testified that he was not concerned when Street Search was not immediately 
listed as a general partner ofthe Street Search Fund in August, 2009, because they were trying to 
get the project launched as quickly as possible and Coleman represented they would "amend" the 
general partnership document in the future. Podesta testified that he believed when Coleman 
changed the name ofthe fund to include Street Search in the title, the name of Podesta's 
company, that evidenced Coleman was acknowledging Street Search's "ownership." (Tr. Vol. 2, 
p. 932, L. 15 to p. 934, L. 4.) 
9. Street Search suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on Coleman's false 
statements. Coleman owed accumulated management and incentive fees to Podesta until the 
breach in March, 2010, and the value of half of the equity in the fund. (Ex. MMM-l.) 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to Street Search, and the amount thereof. Street 
Search calculated its damages and presented testimony in support of these damages through its 
expert witness, CPA Jerry Lichen. (Exs. JJJ and MMM-l.) However, the Court refused to allow 
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Street Search to prove its tort damages, which Street Search was prepared to offer in Exs. 000, 
and PPP. 
Street Search also established the constructive fraud requirement of an existing "special 
relationship." Neither party disputes there was an equal equity agreement regarding the "open-
ended" fund. That relationship existed when Coleman's fraud occurred; at the time the parties 
abandoned the "open-ended" project and decided to pursue "building out" the existing fund. 
Based on the standard applicable to a motion for directed verdict, there was sufficient, if 
not outright compelling evidence of Coleman's fraud and constructive fraud. Consequently, the 
Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed Street Search's fraud and constructive fraud 
claims. 
V. The Trial Court erred when it refused to instruct the Jury regarding promissory 
estoppel. 
Street Search offered a "Promissory Estoppel" jury instruction as Street Search's 
Proposed Jury Instruction No. 10.,,23 Although not stated very artfully, Street Search's counsel 
objected to the Court's refusal to give this instruction. (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1568, L. 8-16.) Judge 
Greenwood then acknowledged he understood the objection and stated his ruling. (T. Vol. 3, p. 
1568, L. 17 to p. 1569, L. 1.).) The standard, "[a] requested jury instruction must be given ifit is 
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, Bailey, 139 Idaho at 750,86 P.3d at 464, but 
the determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to the discretion of the 
23 A copy of Street Search's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 10, regarding Promissory Estoppel is in the Record 
according to Supreme Court Order Granting Third Motion to Augment the Record, dated May 2,2013. A copy is 
attached as Brief Ex. 10. 
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district court," is stated in Craig Johnson v. Floyd Town Architects, 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 
P .3d 648, 651 (2006). 
1. The requested jury instruction was a correct statement of the law. 
Street Search cited to Rule v. Us. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 133 Idaho 669, 
991 P.2d 857 (Ct.App. 1999), as the legal basis to support the elements contained in this 
instruction. The Idaho Supreme Court recently restated and confirmed these elements in Bank of 
Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, Doc. No. 40034, p. 14. (June 20,2013). 
2. This issue was not adequately covered by other instructions. 
There were no other Jury Instructions related to this issue. CR., pp. 648-695.) 
3. The claim is supported by the facts of the case. 
A. Coleman made promises to Street Search. 
[Podesta testifying] 
19. Q. And explain what you mean by 50 percent 
20. ownership of the fund. Is it different than a 
21. general partner interest? 
22. A. He [Coleman] promised me 50 percent of the fund 
23. and 50 percent of the interest in the fund and in 
24. any project or any situation that we were working 
25. on. 
CTr., Vol. 2, p. 361, L. 19-25.) 
In Ex. D, Coleman represents to DuPont that if DuPont was successful in raising "$35 
million you would be entitled to a 15% equity stake in the company that is currently owned 50% 
by Jeff Podesta and 50% owned by Bob Coleman. Coleman sent a courtesy copy of this e-mail 
to Podesta. 
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Then in Ex. RR, Coleman sent Podesta the 50% "cut" of the management and incentive 
fees Coleman promised. 
B. Street Search suffered a substantial detriment in an economic sense in reliance on 
Coleman's promises. 
Through Street Search's hedge fund valuation expert, CPA Jerry Lichen, Street Search 
presented evidence the value of the Street Search Fund was between $1,781,321.00, and 
$2,375,095.00, depending on the respective "earnings multiple." As a 50% owner, Street 
Search's losses were 50% of these numbers, plus 50% of the management and incentive fees 
from December, 2009, until March, 2010. (Approximately $100,000.00. Please see Ex. JJJ.) 
C. Street Search suffered substantial loss while relying on Coleman's 
representations, which was or should have been foreseeable by Coleman. 
Coleman testified that he was in "constant communication" with Podesta between 
August 2009 and November 2009. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 844, L. 14 to p. 845, L. 2.) Coleman 
also told Podesta in Ex. XX, "I wish to express my sincere appreciation for your 
dedication and expertise as we move forward growing the business." (Emphasis 
added.) 
D. Podesta acted reasonably and in justifiable reliance on the promise made. 
In August, 2009, when Coleman lied to Podesta about Street Search's 50% ownership in 
the Street Search Fund and that Coleman would do the paperwork at some future time, Coleman 
and Podesta had been working together since February, 2009, and considered themselves as 
business partners. (See, for example, Ex. L, where Coleman refers to Podesta as his "marketing 
partner.") As noted above, in Ex. D, Coleman is representing to DuPont that Podesta has a 50% 
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ownership interest in the Street Search Fund and that Podesta is involved in general partner-type 
decisions. Coleman then paid Podesta the promised 50% of the management and incentive fees. 
Finally, Coleman thanks Podesta for his "dedication and experience as we move forward 
growing the business." (Ex. XX.) 
4. The Trial Court's refusal to instruct the Jury on Promissory Estoppel, especially after 
the Court dismissed Street Search's fraud claims, was extremely prejudicial to Street 
Search. 
The Jury could have concluded that without a written agreement, there was no contract, 
despite Coleman's admission in Ex. H (Redacted), "The arrangement or agreement between you 
and I was based on your ability to raise capital. We were to share the net fees on capital we both 
raised." Without the fraud claims, or an instruction on Promissory Estoppel, the Jury had no 
alternative way to rule in Street Search's favor, despite the multitude of compelling facts 
establishing there was an agreement. 
VI. The Trial Court Erred when it refused to allow Street Search to prove its tort damages. 
The Trial Judge instructed the Jury regarding damages for breach of fiduciary duty, (R., 
p. 684.) yet unaccountably refused to allow Street Search to present damages beyond those 
damages resulting from Coleman's breach of contract. During the trial, Street Search attempted 
to offer evidence of the value of the Street Search fund as of December, 2011, the last quarter 
before the February, 2012, trial. Ultimately the Trial Court sustained a relevancy objection and 
ruled Street Search was only entitled to contract damages as of the date of the breach in March, 
2010. (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1016, L. 5 to p. 1021, L. 13.) While whether to admit evidence is 
discretionary, Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 102-103,205 P.3d 1235, 1238-29 (2009), Street 
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Search argues the Trial Court abused that discretion when it refused to allow Street Search to 
present proof of its tort damages, considering the Trial Court instructed the Jury on damages 
resulting from breach of a fiduciary duty. 
In Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2001), the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's decision to allow evidence of "lost profits," as tort, not contract 
damages. Here, the Jury was instructed, "If the jury decides Street Search is entitled to recover 
from Profits Plus on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty the jury must determine the amount 
of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the injured party for any loss proximately 
caused by the breach. Whether any damage has been proved is for you to determine." (R., p. 
684.) (Emphasis added) Clearly, any loss would include accumulating lost profits to Street 
Search, which would be Street Search's lost management and incentive fees and loss of the value 
of the fund, up until the time of trial, which Street Search was prepared and attempted to present 
through Jerry Lichen, CPA. (Exs. MMM, NNN, and 000.) 
This decision clearly affected Street Search's substantial rights. The Trial Court's ruling 
conveyed the impression to the Jury the Trial Court did not believe Street Search's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim because the Trial Court did not allow Street Search to prove its damages. 
VII. The Appellants are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
This case involves a breach of contract for failing to transfer 50% interest in the General 
Partner's share of a Limited Partnership. Consequently, the case involves a commercial 
transaction as defined in I.e. § 12-120(3). The "gravamen" of the Appellant's claim deals with a 
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commercial transaction as defined in Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 
466,471,36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001). 
Additionally, the Respondents acknowledged and claimed entitlement to fees pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-120 in their Amended Complaint, (R., p. 376.), triggering the Appellants' entitlement to 
claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120. Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 
614 (2011). Appellants, if they are the prevailing party on appeal, respectfully request that the 
Court grant their motion for attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Appellants respectfully request this Court reverse the Trial Court, find that Idaho 
lacks personal jurisdiction over either Jeff Podesta or his company Street Search, and remand 
with instructions to dismiss the case. 
2. The Appellants respectfully request in the alternative that this Court reverse the Trial 
Court and grant the Appellants a new trial based on the errors stated herein, and correspondingly 
order all judgments set aside as void, including all orders addressing costs and attorney fees. 
Additionally on remand, the Appellants request this Court direct the Trial Court to compel 
Coleman to provide his full and complete IDOF file and to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims and 
enter judgment for the Appellants should Coleman refuse to do so; direct the Trial Court to allow 
Exs". Hand E into evidence at the new trial; direct the Trial Court to allow the Appellants' to 
present and argue their fraud and constructive fraud claims to the Jury at the new trial; direct the 
Trial Court to allow the Appellants to present the full measure of their tort damages at the new 
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trial; and, direct the Trial Court to give the Appellants' promissory estoppel instruction at the 
new trial. 
3. The Appellants also respectfully request the Court grant the Appellants' request for 
attorney fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July, 2013, I served the foregoing, by 
having two true and complete copies hand delivered to: 
Kimbell D. Gourley 
Erika Judd 
JONES GLEDHILL 
FUHRMAN & GOURLEY, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, ID 83701 
ERIC R. CLARK 
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email - agreement to move forward with DuPont .txt 
From : bcoleman [bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com] 
Sent : Tuesday, August 04, 2009 4:06 PM 
TO: steven DU Pont 
cc: Jeff Podesta 
subject: agreement to move forward 
Steven, 
I talked with Jeff. If you are comfortable and agree to the following I will 
wire the $7,500 tomorrow. 
1. Jeff and I a9ree to a payout structure of 20% to you for all management 
fees and incent1ve fees of the fund and up front fees for private accounts. 
This payout would not include the separate storage fees. 
2 . upon raising $35 million you would be entitled to a 15% equity stake i n the 
company that is currently owned 50% by Jeff podesta and 5~k owned by Bob 
coleman. 
3. In order to market the fund the new name will be the Street search, Dollars 
and Sense Growth Fund, LP. The ~eneral partner will remain Profits plus 
capital Management, LLC. This w1ll require minimal paperwork and time to get 
this arrangement off the ground. 
4. For inviduals or institutions wanting to own gold and/or silver through a 
private account, the client's funds will be wired to Profits plus capital 
Management, LLC to purchase the metal. For clients wanting their metal stored 
with us, the client would arrange storage through Idaho Armored Vaults. 
profits plus capital Management will pay 20% of the private account fee to 
you. 
The storage fee is not shared. 
5. Bob Coleman will be 100% responsible for the investment management and 
operati on of the fund and private accounts. 
when you raise the required capital to become an equity owner we can review 
the operational responsibilities, titles, structure, etc. 
please let me know if you agree. Once I receive your approval by email and 






Print Page I of I 
SuQject Re: incentive fee 
From: bcoleman (bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com) 
To: jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com: 
Date: Thursday, November 12. 2009 5:09 PM 
Jeff, 
\ calculated the fees and the wire to send you, Let me know if you have any questions. Your wire shou ld 
be $\9,841.83 . 




$3,036.00 $6 ,817.00 
.. $1,01200" $2 .272.33 
$1 ,DOOm $1,000.00 
net management fee • $1,02400. $3 ,54467 
50% of net management fee. $512.00 .. $1,772.33. 
Thanks 
Bob Coleman 
bcoJeman wrote : 
Jeff, 
The total incentive fee payable is $35,115. 




The total management fee from Aug and Sept is $3,036 and $6,817 respectively, The fees 
for accounting and storage have not been deducted from these tees. One third of the 
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Print Page 1 of 1 
Subject: Re: Oct. & Nov. Management Distribution 
From: bcoleman (bcoleman@golds ilvervault .com) 
To: jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com; 
Date: Wednesday. December 23. 2009 11 :29 AM 
Jeff, 
I am wiring you $6,606.60 . This is 20% of the gross management fees for October and November. I 
wish to express my sincere apprec iation for your dedication and expertise as we move forward growing 
the business. 
J am hoping to close on the building this week . The bank is requiring me to put more money down than 
first quoted . 
I am working with Corky to start the build out by the tirst week in January. 
Thanks 
Bob Co leman 
Jeff Podesta wrote: 
Bob, 
Is there any way we could take the Oct.-Nov. Management fee ASAP? Hoping 
to handle some year-end stuff. Thanks, Jeff 
JPEml001368 
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This contract b~ I\\~Cn Robert Cokman. sol ..: own.:!" of' Pro li ts Plu~ Capital Managcment. LLC 
and kiT Podesta. sole owner of Sm.'!.'l Search. LLC tCrlnin:1t6 all previolls agreements :ltlcUor 
ariangCi11cnts eit her yerbal or \\T!Ucn reg.~lrdin~ ~ll! ~!~pc(lS incJudi!1L!. :11) ri~ hts. obii !!~1!i ons. 
responsibili ties. :lnd rC\'CllliC rrom lh~' Do l1:1rs ~lIld SC!1SC Gro\\·th Ft~nd. LP also l1a~.::d SIred 
Search Dollars and Sense Growth Fund. LP cn~cti\c as \)1' ;\larch 1,2010. Any and 3.11 future 
agreements will be in wrilillg and be \'Jl id from thai dale ii.>rw:lrd. 
This agreement will be kept conJiticmiJI. Rober! Coleman and Profi ts Plus Capital iv1anagemcm 
will not contac t clients or inVt!SIOrS or Je rI' Podesta and Sin:cl S.::arch. Jdr Podcsta and Slreet 
Search will not col1lact cl ients and investors or Robcrt Coleman, Prorits Plus Capital 
ivtanagemenl. and Dolbrs and Sense Growth Fund. 
The wording Street S~arch will be n:mon;d from ( h~ titk of the Strt::et Search Dllilars ::md Sense 
Growth Fund. LP. Street Search will b:.:: removed rrom all documents (On~ring Memorandum. 
Limited Partnersh ip Agreement. and Sub.·criplion :\g.r':clllent) 
Profits Plus will have to retain written consent n'oll1 Jcff Podesta 10 usc Street Search in any sales 
brochures. Jeff Podesta will have to retaill written conscnt frolll Robert Coleman 10 use Dollars 
and Sense Growth Fund or Profits Plus Capiwl Managemcll1 ill any sales brochures. 
Robert Coleman has never had and ncver will ha\'c any control or connection with the business 
dealings or responsibililies of Street Search. LLC. Jerf Podesta has ne\'er had ancI never will have 
any control or connection with the dealings or responsibilitic-s or Profi ts Plus Capital 
Management. LLC. Profits PillS Capital Management has always been and will continue to be the 
sole owner of ihe Dollars and Sense Growth Fllnd, LP. 
Robert Co leman will agree to pay Ihe remainder portion ofmanagcmclll fces owed to Jeff 
Podesta for December 2009. JanU<11)' 20 I O. Fcbruary 20 I O. The amount equal: the sum of 20% of 
the gross management fcc for the 3 months minus the $5.000 payment on January 19,20) O. 
This ::l1notll1l totals as follows: 
December 2009 - S6.703.00 
January 20 10 - S6.23S.S0 
FcbnJary 20 10- So.400.00 
The fina l and compie-Ie pay111cnt wi II be S 1-1.341 .IW. ' j hIS Jll10unt \Vi II bl.! wired upon the 
opproval and "<ceptonee or thi' ogreement by Rnbert C,,\eman and JelT Podesta. EXHIBIT ~ 
Robert Coleman 
Profits Pius Capi!ai ;vlanagcmcnt. L! C 
March 3. 20 I 0 
.klT Podesta 
Street Search. LLC 
i'v1:lrch 3, ~OIO 
JPEm!OO1426 

Print Page I of I 
Subject: Re: Clos ing & Management Fee 
From: bcoleman (bcoleman@goldsilvervauft.coml 
To: jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com: 
Date: Tuesday, March 2, 2010 11 :14 AM 
Jeff: 
We need to talk about this arrangement. I was under the impression that you could raise capital from 
your own sources. The only funds raised have been from my clients . The management fees from the 
fund are going to building out a secure facility and running the operations of the fund. I can not afford 
nor justify to pay you for marketing without any capital raised on your end . 
I changed the name of the fund based on your expertise and track record of rais ing capital. Since August 
2009. I have not seen any capital brought in from your clients or prospects. The funds I have paid you 
have been fair compensation for your time and efforts. 
I am frankly disgusted about the Dupont situation. I relied on your advice to bring him on board and 
now DuPont feels that lowe him hundreds of thousands of dollars. I can not have this hanging over my 
head any longer. I have wasted $10,000 and countless hours of time and out of pocket expenses dealing 
with this individual. I am now having to defend myself from any accusations this individual dreams up. I 
have invested my life into this business to build the trust and confidence needed to attract clients, I do 
not want to risk all my hard work on someone who could simply sabotage my reputation for his 
amusement. I have been advised to completely disassociate myself from using Street Search because of 
Dupont alone. This includes having Street Search removed from the name of the fund and the website. 
I want to continue to work with you, however, the arrangement needs to be on the basis of a consulting 
arrangement on the capital you raise and not part of the management fees raised by my clients. I would 
like to discuss this with you. 
Thanks 
Bob Coleman 
Jeff Podesta wrote: 
Bob, 
How did things go with the tests yesterday? Also could you wire ASAP the 
Management fees due over the Dec ,. Jan., Feb. period. Keep me posted. JP 
EXHIBIT 
JPEmlOO1423 
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Print Page 1 of2 
SuiUect: Re: Closing & Management Fee 
From: Jeff Podesta (jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.c:om) 
To: bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com; 
Date: Tuesdey. March 2. 2010 6:23 PM 
Call me in the morning. Read sentence #4. Illegal, IlIegal,il1egaL And then some. Remember it is "we" 
not "I", You are 50% and 1 am 50%. 
That is the agreement NOT an arrangement. Stealing MY portion of the fees for your personal use is 
against the law.I am your partner not 
a hired worker. 
From: bcoIeman <bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com> 
To: Jeff Podesta <jeffpodesta200O@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Tue, March 2, 20101:14:43 PM 
Subject: Re: Oosing & Management Fee 
Jeff, 
We need to talk about this arrangement. I was under the impression that you could raise capital from 
your own sources. The only funds raised have been from my clients. The management fees from the 
fund are going to building out a secure facility and running the operations of the fund. I can not afford 
nor justify to pay you for marketing without any capital raised on your end. 
I changed the name of the fund based on your expertise and track record of raising capital. Since August 
2009, I have not seen any capital brought in from your clients or prospects. The funds I have paid you 
have been fair compensation for your time and efforts. 
I am frankly disgusted about the Dupont situation. I relied on your advice to bring him on board and 
now DuPont feels that lowe him hundreds of thousands of dollars. I can not have this hanging over my 
head any longer. I have wasted $10,000 and countless hours of time and out of pocket expenses dealing 
with this individual. I am now having to defend myself from any accusations this individual dreams up. I 
have invested my life into this business to build the trust and confidence needed to attract clients. I do 
not want to risk all my hard work on someone who could simply sabotage my reputation for his 
amusement I have been advised to completely disassociate myself from using Street Search because of 
Dupont alone. This includes having Street Search removed from the name of the fund and the website. 
I want to continue to work with you, however, the arrangement needs to be on the basis of a conSUlting 
arrangement on the capital you raise and not part of the management fees raised by my clients. I would 
like to discuss this with you. 
EXHIBIT_k _ Thanks 
Bob Coleman 





Print Page 1 of3 
Suhject: Re: Closing & Management Fee 
~. From: Jeff Podesta (jefipodesta2000@yshoo.com) 
To: bcoleman@goldsilvervautt.com; 
DElte: Wednesday. March ·3. 2010 9:07 AM 
Bob, 
You are 50% owner of the fund.l have written proof. I have verbal agreements. I have multiple 
witnesses that heard you say we are 
50150 partners. I have conversations where you were worried if we took on another "partner" you 
would have less than 50%. Remember 
Thomas Group,remember lSI, remember ABN? You have crossed the line from being ethical to 
being a criminal. You have entered 
into a contract to buy a building that is in your own name. A building that is oversized. As you have 
said "we" need only about 10% 
of the space. You said back in November that you had the money. I didn't for a moment think you 
would "steal" my part of the fees 
to "close" on this building. I guess when you screwed up investing the fund in December and didn't 
hedge the assets you decided 
to cross the line. Bob - until I got involved you never raised money or had any high level prospects 
or meetings. In fact the biggest 
client to corne into our fund came in after we had our agreement. Bob ~ as a partner you "failed" to 
close on a location in December.Inexcuseable. 
Also in December you failed to perform as a "fund manager." No profits in an asset class where all 
your peers were 
making money for the clients. It is time to face reality. According to my records that would include 
the months of October, November, 
December, January, February, and March there are fees due me of at least $109,412. 
From: bcoleman < bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com> 
To: Jeff Podesta <jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com> 
Sent.: Wed, March 3, 2010 2:59:08 AM 
Subject: Re: Closing & Management Fee 
Jeff, 
I am not stealing anything. As the owner and investment manager of the fund, I have a fiduciary 
responsibility to secure the assets of the fund. Part of my responsibility is to create an environment that 
protects the fund's assets. 
Tne arrangement or agreement between you and I was based on your ability to raise capital. We were to 
share the net fees on capital we both raised. The fact is since August 2009, you have not brought any 
clients to the fund. I have not seen any true interest from potential investors regarding the marketing 
efforts (example Hedgefund weekly article) and have tossed $\0,000 and numerous hours of time and 
out of pocket expenses on a consultant which you recommended. The sharin of fees did not have 
J~~ISbT _~ 
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Print Page 2 of3 
anything to do with the ownership and control of the fund. 
Please read the following attachment which terminates our current relationship and has calculated the 
management fee owed to you. I would like to continue working with you, however, we need an 
agreement that provides more incentive to you for capital that you raise. After signing the attachment, I 
would suggest a consulting arrangement whereby you receive a higher weighting split of the incentive 
and net management fees on assets you raise. This would encourage and incentivize you to raise capital. 




Call me in the morning.Read sentence #4. Illegal, IlIega\,iJlegal. And then some. 
Remember it is "we" not "I". You are 50% and I am 50%. 
That is the agreement NOT an arrangement Stealing MY portion of the fees for your 
personal use is against the law.I am your partner not 
a hired worker. 
From:bcoleman <ocoleman@goldsilvervaultcom> 
To: Jeff Podesta<jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Tue, March 2, 2010 1:14:43 PM 
Subject: Re: Ooslng& Management Fee 
Jeff, 
We need to talk about this arrangement. I was under the impression that you could raise 
capital from your own sources. The only funds raised have been from my clients. The 
management fees from the fund are going to building out a secure facility and running the 
operations of the fund. I can not afford nor justify to pay you for marketing without any 
capital raised on your end. 
I changed the name of the fund based on your expertise and track record of raising capital. 
Since August 2009, I have not seen any capital brought in from your clients or prospects. 
The funds I have paid you have been fair compensation for your time and efforts. 
I am frankly disgusted about the Dupont situation. I relied on your advice to bring him on 
board and now DuPont feels that lowe him hundreds of thousands of dollars. I can not have 
this hanging over my head any longer. I have wasted $10,000 and countless hours of time 
and out of pocket expenses dealing with this individual. I am now having to defend myself 
from any accusations this individual dreams up. I have invested my life into this business to 
build the trust and confidence needed to attract clients. I do not want to risk all my hard 
work on someone who could simply sabotage my reputation for his amusement. 1 have 
been advised to completely disassociate myself from using Street Search because of Dupont 





• From: bcoIeman <bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com> 
To: Jeff Podesta <jeffp0desta2000@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Wed, March 3, 2010 2:59:08 AM 
Subject: Re: Closing & Management Fee 
Jeff, 
I am not stealing anything. As the owner and investment manager of the fund, I have a fiduciary 
responsibility to secure the assets of the fund. Part of my responsibility is to create an environment that 
protects the fund's assets. 
The arrangement or agreement between you and I was based on your ability to raise capital. We were to 
share the net fees on capital we both raised. The fact is since August 2009, you have not brought any 
clients to the fund. I have not seen any true interest from potential investors regarding the marketing 
efforts (example Hedgefund weeldy article) and have lossed $10,000 and numerous hours of time and 
out of pocket expenses on a consultant which you recommended. The sharing of fees did not have 
anything to do with the ownership and control of the fund. 
Thanks 
Bob Coleman 
Jeff Podesta wrote: 
Call me in the morning Read sentence #4. Illegal, IIIegal,ilIegal. And then some. 
Remember it is "we" not "I". You are 50% and 1 am 50%. 
That is the agreement NOT an arrangement. Stealing MY portion of the fees for your 
personal use is against the law.l am your partner not 
a hired worker. 
From:bcoleman <bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com> 
To: Jeff Podesta<jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Tue, March 2,20101:14:43 PM 
Subject: Re: Oosing& Management Fee 
Jeff, 
We need to talk about this arrangement. I was under the impression that you could raise 
capital from your own sources. The only funds raised have been from my clients. The 
management fees from the fund are going to building out a secure facility and running the 
operations of the fund. I can not afford nor justify to pay you for marketing without any 
capita] raised on your end. 
EXHIBIT~ 

Print Page I of 4 
Subject Re: repayment of $250,000. US D. 
From: booleman (bcoleman@goldsilvervault.com) 
To: streetsearch@myspace.com: 
Co: jeffpodesta2000@yahoo.com: dupontmaui@gmail.com: 
Date: Monday, February 22, 2010 10:48 AM 
Steve, 
I have attached one of the contracts signed and returned by you. There is only one mention of Street 
Search and that was used in the name ofthe fund that you were trying to raise money for , Jeff is not 
responsible for your actions, You are not an agent of Jeff's company. You solely accepted the 
responsibility and potential reward for introducing my program to individuals. 
Please do not use delay tactics to avoid your responsibilities, I only wish to settle this matter. You told 
me repeatedly that you are a gentleman and you could and will easily payback the money I forwarded 
you. I only ask that you keep your word, 
This badgering is a complete waste of time. I would like to move forward and settle this matter. 
As for Kay Bergstrom. If you had no intention to pay me back and she is not your assistant, then she 
should not have accepted the initial wire payment. 
Bob Coleman 
Steven Christian Du Pont wrote: 
>RC, 
> Your letter proves you are psychologically challenged if not demented . 
The agreement, clearly states, 'Street Search .. .' 
*D 0 you u n d e r s tan dEn g lis h? 
Review your baseless allegations carefully. 





> You have the audacity to extort funds from Kay Bergstrom? 





EXT 0 R T ION, is a felony. 
> ----------------- Original Message -----------------









STREET SEARCH'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Promissory Estoppel 
Even in the absence of consideration, however, the law recognizes that in 
some circumstances a promise may become enforceable by reason of the 
promisee's having justifiably relied upon it. itA promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on the part of the 
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise." Promissory estoppel requires the following elements: 
1) the detriment suffered in reliance on the promise was substantial in an 
economic sense; 
2) the substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have 
been foreseeable by the promisor; and 
3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the 
promise made. 
Rule v. US BANK NAT. ASSN, 991 P.2d 857, 133 Idaho 669 (Idaho App., 
1999) 
Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67-68, 625 P.2d 417, 
421-22 (l981l (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
90(1) (1973». See also Day, supra; Mohr v. Shulg:, 86 Idaho 531. 540,388 
P.2d 1002, 1008(964). Mitchell v. Bingham Meml ) Hosp .. 130 Idaho 420, 
425, 942 P .2d 544. 549 (1997); Smith, supra; Mohr, supra 
Given 
"----Refused. __ _ 
Modified. __ _ 
Covered. __ _ 
Other ___ _ fJ(HIB!T.J~_._ 
